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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
WALTER E. HELLER WESTERN 
INCORPORATED, a California 
corporation, 
Appellant, 
v. 
U.S. ROCK WOOL COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation; V. ROSS 
EKINS; and, S. O. EKINS; 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 860322 
Respondents. 
ooOoo 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
case: 
1. Whether the district court, in interpreting 
an unconditional guaranty agreement, erroneously concluded 
that the guarantors under that agreement did not consent to 
the lender's alleged impairment of collateral. 
2. Whether the district court committed 
reversible error in failing to consider that the guarantors' 
defense of impairment of collateral is unavailable where the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guarantors are the controlling shareholders of the corporate 
borrower whose loan obligations are being guaranteed. 
3. Whether the district court erred in failing 
to consider that the guarantorsf as controlling shareholders 
of the corporate borrower, had an affirmative duty to ensure 
the lender's perfection of security interests in the 
collateral pledged as security for the debt. 
4. Whether thp district court's finding that the 
lender unjustifiably impaired collateral pledged by the 
borrower as security for the debt was clearly erroneous. 
5. Whether the district court's finding that the 
lender breached its duty of good faith in seeking to enforce 
the guaranty agreement was clearly erroneous. 
6. Whether the district court improperly 
admitted expert testimony based on neither personal 
knowledge nor assumed hypothetical facts. 
7. Whether the district court erred in awarding 
the guarantors all attorneys' fees incurred in the case. 
8. Whether the district court erred in refusing 
to grant a new trial for irregularities in its proceedings 
consisting of improper ex parte communications between the 
court and the guarantors' counsel concerning the merits of 
the case. 
2 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by a secured lender to exercise its 
rights under a continuing, unconditional guaranty executed 
by the controlling shareholders of a corporate borrower. 
The guarantors are attempting to avoid liability under their 
guaranty by claiming that the lender impaired the collateral 
pledged by the corporate borrower as security for the debt, 
despite their unambiguous waiver of that defense in their 
guaranty. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
In this action, appellant, Walter E. Heller Western 
Incorporated ("Heller"), sought judgment against 
respondents, V. Ross Ekins ("R. Ekins") and S. O. Ekins 
(collectively, the "Ekins"), for $86,202.42 under a 
December 27, 1979 guaranty agreement in favor of Heller (the 
"Guaranty"). The Ekins1 obligations under the Guaranty were 
secured by a deed of trust lien on their house. After a 
four-day, non-jury trial, the district court entered a 
memorandum decision that found that the Ekins were 
"exempted" from liability under the Guaranty because of 
Heller's impairment of collateral and its "bad faith" and 
"premature" filing of a complaint to foreclose its trust 
deed lien. Beyond this, the district court awarded the 
Ekins-attorneys1 fees in the amount of $63,718.38. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Heller seeks reversal of the judgment and either 
(i) entry of judgment in its favor as a matter of lawf or 
(ii) a remand with directions to the district court to grant 
Heller a new trial free from the taint of the district 
court's numerous substantive and procedural errors. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Accounts Receivable Loan To Rock Wool. 
Heller is a California corporation that engages in the 
business of making commercial loans. (R. 3f 52). 
Defendant, U. S. Rock Wool Company, Inc. ("Rock Wool"), 
before its liquidation in bankruptcy in 1984f was a Utah 
corporation that manufactured and sold insulation. (R. 52; 
Exhibit "Y"). Since 1978, the Ekins have owned 
approximately 99.67% of all the issued and outstanding 
shares of Rock Wool's capital stock. (Tr. 1672). Since 
approximately 1952, the Ekins1 primary source of income was 
the salary paid to them by Rock Wool. (Tr. 1673). 
In October 1979, R. Ekins, the president of Rock Wool, 
began negotiating with Heller to obtain accounts receivable 
financing for Rock Wool. (Tr. 1559-60). Due to Rock Wool's 
uncertain financial condition, at that time, Rock Wool was 
unable to obtain financing from conventional lending sources 
such as banks or thrift companies. (Tr. 1293, 1546). After 
several meetings and a review of Rock Wool's financial 
4 
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condition. Heller agreed to provide the requested 
financing, (Tr. 1274-75). Accordingly, Heller and Rock 
Wool (through the Ekins) entered into an accounts receivable 
loan arrangement (the "Loan") that was evidenced by a loan 
agreement dated December 27, 1979 (the "Loan Agreement") 
whereby Heller agreed to loan to Rock Wool up to 65% of the 
face value of any of Rock Wool's accounts " . . . which 
Heller in its sole discretion considered] eligible for 
borrowing." (Exhibit "A"; App. i). 
Rock Wool secured its obligations under the Loan 
Agreement by granting Heller a continuing general lien and 
security interest in (i) all of Rock Wool's accounts 
receivable, instruments, chattel paper, general intangibles 
and contract rights, (ii) all of Rock Wool's inventory, 
goods and related materials, and (iii) all of Rock Wool's 
machinery, equipment and chattels. These security interests 
were evidenced by three separate security agreements. 
(Exhibits "A", "B" and "D"). Heller did not perfect its 
security interest in Rock Wool's motor vehicles. (R. 
1073). 
As additional security for the Loan, and to induce 
Heller to make the Loan, the Ekins executed and delivered to 
Heller the Guaranty. (Exhibit "F"; App. ii). Under the 
Guaranty, the Ekins unconditionally guaranteed all debts, 
obligations and liabilities then or later owing by Rock Wool 
5 
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to Heller, (Id.) The Guaranty provided in pertinent part 
that: 
"[Heller] shall not be required to prosecute 
collection, enforcement or other remedies 
against the debtor [Rock Wool], or against 
any person liable on any said . . . agree-
ments, obligations, indebtedness or liability 
so guaranteed, or to enforce or resort to any 
security, liens, collateral or other rights 
or remedies thereto appertaining, before 
calling on [the Ekins] for payment; nor shall 
[the Ekins'] liability in any way be released 
or affected by reason of any failure or delay 
on [Heller's] part so to doT 
This guaranty is absolute, unconditional 
and continuing . . . . " (Id.) (Emphasis 
added). 
Beginning in January, 1980, Heller began making loan 
advances to Rock Wool under the Loan Agreement. Pursuant to 
paragraph 3(f) of the Loan Agreement, Heller provided Rock 
Wool with a monthly statement of Rock Wool's loan account. 
(Tr. 1294). Paragraph 3(f) specified that the loan account 
" . . . will conclusively be deemed correct and accepted by 
[Rock Wool], unless [Rock Wool] gives Heller a written 
statement of exceptions within thirty (30) days after 
receipt of such extract or statement." (Exhibit "A", 11 
3(f)). Rock Wool never provided Heller with any such 
statement of exceptions. (Tr. 1294). 
2. The Valley Loan. 
In May, 1981, the Ekins began negotiating with Valley 
Bank & Trust Company ("Valley Bank") to obtain a loan for 
themselves. (Tr. 1615-17). As a condition to making that 
6 
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loan, Valley Bank required that Heller subordinate its trust 
deed lien on the Ekins1 house to a trust deed lien to be 
granted by the Ekins to Valley Bank. (Tr. 1617). 
Accordingly, Valley Bank and Heller entered into a 
subordination agreement dated May 11, 1981 (the 
"Subordination Agreement") (Exhibit "DD"; App. iii) which 
provided in pertinent part that: 
"In consideration of the credit extended to 
borrower [the Ekins] by the Bank [Valley 
Bank]f the undersigned [Heller] hereby 
subordinates its security interest in the 
described security [the real property 
described in Heller's trust deed] to the 
above security interests of the Bank. The 
Bank may extend, modify or renew the so 
secured obligation without affecting this 
subordination. The undersigned agrees not to 
demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize 
on the security or the security interest or 
to take any direct or indirect action to 
obtain or realize such security until such 
time as Bank is paid in full. The 
undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to 
Bank immediately upon receipt any of the 
described security or proceeds thereof." 
(Emphasis added). (Id.) 
The Ekins did not sign the Subordination Agreement. (Id.) 
7 
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3. Rock Wool's Financial Deterioration And Collapse. 
During 1982f Rock Wool's financial condition began 
deteriorating rapidly. (Exhibits "M" and "0").1 Heller's 
October 1982 audit of Rock Wool's operations disclosed an 
increasing net operating loss; a persistent negative working 
capital position and a negative net worth. (Exhibit "0"). 
By letter dated October 22, 1982, Heller advised Rock Wool 
that it would continue its accounts receivable financing 
arrangement for no more than an additional sixty days. 
(Id.) By November 12, 1982f Rock Wool's loan availability, 
based on its then eligible accounts, was a negative 
$631.28. (Tr. 1401-04, 1418). In December 1982, Rock Wool 
pleaded for an extension of time in which its outstanding 
loan balance could be " . . . gradually paid off." (Exhibit 
"P"). By letter dated December 23, 1982, Heller agreed to 
the requested extension, advising Rock Wool that: 
"Under the circumstances and primarily 
because we continue to hold an equity 
That deterioration was discerned as early as 1980 when 
Rock Wool's auditors noted in their annual report for 
the periods ending December 31, 1978 and December 31, 
1979 that: 
11
 Unless management takes appropriate 
measures the capital structure will not 
sustain continued losses of this 
magnitude)." (Exhibit D-15). 
There is no evidence that management took any such 
measures to stop Rock Wool's financial bleeding. 
8 
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position in Ross Ekins' residence, I will 
continue to finance U. S. Rock Wool under our 
existing formulas for an additional period 
not to exceed six months from 12-31-82. Your 
current borrowings approximate $80,000 which 
is based on a 65% advance against your 
eligible accounts receivable. 
Because we must continue to carry you for a 
period not to exceed six months I want you to 
reduce your overall borrowings from us by at 
least $10,000 a month, but in no event 
greater than 65% of your eligible 
collateral. 
Assuming your loan at 12-31-82 approximates 
$80,000 I would then expect your loan not to 
exceed $70,000 at Jan. '83 and, $60,000 at 
Feb., and $50,000 at March end and so on 
until you are totally paid out but in no 
event later than June 30, 1983." (Exhibit 
MQ"). 
Two weeks later, on January 5, 1983, Rock Wool advised 
Heller of its probable inability to reduce the loan balance 
by the required $10,000 per month. (Exhibit "R"). At that 
point, Rock Wool's loan availability, based on its then 
eligible accounts, had grown to a negative $7,589. Id. 
In mid-January, 1983, Heller's internal auditors 
discovered a mistake in the accounts receivable aging 
schedules that had been submitted by Rock Wool and the Ekins 
to Heller: the schedule understated the age of every 
account by thirty days. (Tr. 1286-88, 1311, 1312). As a 
result, accounts that had been designated by Rock Wool and 
the Ekins as thirty days past due were actually sixty days 
past due; accounts that had been designated by Rock Wool and 
the Ekins as sixty days past due were actually ninety days 
9 
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past due, and so on. (^ d.) On January 25, 1983, Heller 
advised Rock Wool of that problem and of its concern over 
the continuing increase in Rock Wool's negative loan 
availability. (Exhibit "S"). On that date. Heller also 
advised Rock Wool that Heller still wanted it to reduce its 
loan balance at the rate of $10,000 per month. (.Id.) Rock 
Wool did not do so. (Tr. 1289, 1796, 1797; Exhibit "R"). 
On February 7, 1983, Heller's account analyst, James E. 
Hillman ("Hillman"), determined that Heller had received no 
collections from Rock Wool's account debtors since 
January 31, 1983, and had received only $9,031 from Rock 
Wool's debtors during the entire month of January 1983. 
(Exhibit "S"; Tr. 1289). It was obvious to Hillman that 
Rock Wool was in no position to cure its numerous defaults 
under the Loan Agreement or to meet Heller's payment 
schedule, and accordingly, on February 8, 1983, Heller 
exercised its right under the Loan Agreement to notify Rock 
Wool's account debtors to remit directly to Heller all 
monies owing to Rock Wool. (Exhibit "T"; Tr. 1315-17; 1342-
45). 
4. Commencement Of This Action. 
Six weeks later, Heller filed its complaint in this 
action to recover the principal sum of $116,700.43 plus 
accrued interest, costs and attorneys' fees. (R. 2-14). 
Ten months later, Heller filed an amended complaint to 
10 
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reduce the amount of Heller's claim (R. 303-39) because the 
amount sought in its original complaint was inadvertantly 
and unintentionally overstated. (Tr. 1290-92). 
On December 6, 1983, Rock Wool filed a petition for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah. Heller sought and obtained from the Bankruptcy Court 
an order granting it relief from the automatic stay imposed 
by 11 U.S.C. § 362 for the purpose of enabling Heller to 
liquidate Rock Wool's liability under the Loan Agreement. 
On May 3, 1984, Heller filed its proof of claim with the 
Bankruptcy Court to assert and preserve its secured claim 
against Rock Wool in the amount of $71,780.48 plus accrued 
and accruing post-petition interest, late charges, services 
charges and attorneys' fees. (Exhibit "Z"). There is no 
evidence that Rock Wool objected to Heller's proof of 
claim. 
On December 7, 1983, Heller's legal counsel tendered to 
Valley Bank a check in the amount of $55,000 to pay off 
Valley Bank "in full" as contemplated by the Subordination 
Agreement. (Exhibit "II"). Valley Bank, at the Ekins' 
insistence, refused to accept that tender. (R. 1076). 
On May 3, 1984, the district court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Heller by conclusively 
determining that the outstanding principal balance 
11 
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established by Heller's books and records of account as 
owing by Rock Wool was $73f670.75 through March 1, 1984. 
(R. 456f 557-59). The court expressly reserved for 
trial the issue of Rock Wool's liability to Heller under 
the Loan Agreement for the period subsequent to March 1, 
1984. (Id.)2 
5. The District Court's Finding That The Ekins' Were 
"Exempted" From Liability Under The Guaranty. 
After a four-day, non-jury trial, the court issued a 
memorandum decision holding that (i) Heller's termination of 
the Loan Agreement (at a time in which Rock Wool was in 
default and had a negative loan availability)/ and Heller's 
exercise of its undisputable right to notify Rock Wool's 
account debtors to make payment directly to Heller, was 
"intended" by Heller to be an " . . . impairment of the 
accounts receivable inventory which of course eventually 
destroyed U. S. Rock Wool as an operable going concern"; 
(ii) Heller took actions "counterproductive" to its recovery 
Rock Wool's counsel approved as to form Heller's order 
granting partial summary judgment. That order was then 
submitted to the district court for signature. 
Howeverf the district court never signed it. At trial/ 
when asked whyf the district court answered that: 
"This [an accounting exhibit offered by the 
Ekins] is Mr. Tanner's [the Ekins1 counsel] 
attempt to have me reconsider that [the 
partial summary judgment order]. And of 
course, in the course of a trial I suppose 
that's proper." (Tr. 1761). 
12 
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of Rock Wool's accounts receivable and M . . . failed in 
their responsibility as factors to the borrower"; andf 
(iii) Heller acted in " . . . bad faith in going against the 
personal residence of the Ekins, proceeding with foreclosure 
in a sum which was not due and owing and in failing to first 
deal with the problem of Valley Bank & Trust . . . . " The 
court then concluded that because of that conduct/ the Ekins 
were "exempted" from the claim of [Heller]". (R. 748-50). 
6. The Court's Refusal To Enter A Finding As To Whether 
The Ekins Waived The Defense Of Impairment Of 
Collateral. 
Notably/ in the memorandum decision/ the court failed 
even to address the issue of whether the Ekins had/ under 
the Guaranty/ waived the defense of impairment of 
collateral. (IdL) Even though all parties recognized that 
the dispositive issue in the case was whether the Ekins had 
waived that right (Tr. 1835)/ the district court felt 
otherwise. Its position was articulated in an incredible 
colloquy with counsel for the Ekins during a hearing on 
Heller's post-trial objections to the Ekins' proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
The Court: Give me the reason. Why is it [the 
proposed finding of fact that the Ekins 
did not waive the defense of impairment 
of collateral] placed in there? Because 
she [Justice Durham in the case of 
Continental Bank v. Utah Sec. Mortg.f 
701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985)] said 
something about a case that had a 
contract on a guaranty? 
13 
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Mr. Tanner: This is the reason, Your Honor. One of 
[The Ekins' necessary elements to a holding that the 
legal counsel] impairment of a security by failing to 
perfect and by not pursuing the 
receivables, etc., one of those 
essential elements to affirming a 
decision that the conduct does in fact 
release the guarantor, is a holding that 
the guarantor has not consented to those 
acts, to the release or the 
impairment. 
Now, — 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
I didn't find that. That's not in this 
case. 
this 
must 
Why are you 
case? It's 
have tried 
not in 
another 
putting 
this case 
case. 
it 
You 
in 
You 
're 
thinking of another judge. 
No, Your Honor. It's in the arguments 
of this case, and it's a pivotal 
issue. Mr. Anderson has correctly 
espoused it as the issue that — that is 
central to the question of release, and 
we argued it before and during — 
The Court; I 
di 
don' 
.dn't 
t 
li 
attention 
think 
sten to 
to it, 
that's 
that, 
and ii 
in th: 
didn 
t has 
i.s 
•t 
nc 
case. 
pay 
ithing 
I 
any 
to 
Mr. Tanner: The guaranty clause, to conclude from 
that that it does not constitute a 
consent or waiver of the right to be 
free from impairment of security, is an 
essential element of the cause. 
The Court: No, I don't think so. You will have to 
appeal me on that, but I don't think 
so. 
What I thought Mr. Ekins said was the 
truth, that he was told by the people 
from — representing Heller that they 
wouldn't do anything to impair the 
contract and so they wouldn't go ahead 
and file those things. They would keep 
those things out of this deal or they 
didn't, which every way you went on that 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Tanner: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
The Court: 
Mr. Tanner: 
situation. And he said when I was on my 
mission with Book of Mormon in one hand 
and Bible in the other I realized I was 
home freef because they would have to go 
after my trucks and things before they 
sell my house. And I believe that's 
exactly the representation they made to 
him. And I believe that to be the 
truth, and that's a finding of fact. 
But there has to be a finding that there 
was no consent on the Ekins' part, 
otherwise under California law or — 
and/or under Utah law they will go up 
and reverse it and the Court's 
conclusions will be of no avail. 
I don't think so. Let's try it. I 
don't think that's in this case. I 
think you're putting a lot of things in 
the case that are not there. Why do you 
put that in? 
The reason I've just explained. 
I know you explained it to mef but that 
doesn't make any sense to me, because 
what he did is exactly what he intended 
to do. 
But Your Honor, he signed a Guaranty — 
Yeah. 
— as well as did — 
Sure. 
All right. Now, this Court has to 
decide that Guaranty did not waive their 
right to — did not have the security 
impaired because it's the writing that 
they signed. If the Court does not 
interpret it in that fashion, it cannot 
sustain that portion of the Court's 
decision and that is — I mean 
unequivocal. So that — 
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The Court: I thinkfs its equivocal as the 
dickens. I don't think that's in this 
case. I keep telling you that. 
(Tr. 1834-38). 
Several weeks later on April 29, 1986f the district 
court conducted a second hearing on Heller's objections to 
the Ekins' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. At that hearing, it advised the parties that its 
comments at the March 28 hearing were made for the purpose 
of supposedly having counsel 
" . . . pare down some of the things which I 
thought overly broadened the information I 
had given you in the memorandum decision and 
was not necessarily my final word on what I 
thought ought to be in the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. I stated a simple 
proposition for the simple reason for 
negotiation purposes, for shortening up your 
work and address the issues more directly. 
And in that regard I have been successful. 
The findings, as I now look at them, 
accurately represent this court's mind at the 
time the memorandum decision was prepared and 
published to the litigants." (Tr. 1899). 
Heller timely filed its notice of appeal from the 
district court's judgment. (R. 1209-10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Under Utah law, the trial court's interpretation 
of a written agreement (such as the Guaranty) presents a 
question of law. As such, this court owes no deference to 
the district court's interpretation and can independently 
interpret the Guaranty, give effect to its plain meaning and 
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conclude as a matter of law that the Ekins consented to 
Heller's alleged impairment of collateral. 
2. The Ekins, as guarantors under the Guaranty, are 
precluded from complaining about Heller's alleged impairment 
of collateral because the Guaranty does not require Heller 
to enforce or resort to any collateral before compelling 
payment from the Ekins. Therefore, under the Guaranty, the 
Ekins explicitly consented to Heller's alleged impairment of 
collateral. The district court's failure to so interpret 
the Guaranty constitutes reversible error. 
3. The Ekins, as controlling shareholders of Rock 
Wool, are precluded as a matter of law from claiming a 
discharge under the Guaranty. Numerous cases recognize that 
where the guarantor controls the debtor, the guarantor is 
precluded from claiming a discharge based on the creditor's 
failure to perfect its lien in the collateral. The district 
court's inexplicable failure to recognize that principle 
constitutes reversible error. 
4. As controlling shareholders of Rock Wool, the 
Ekins had an affirmative duty to ensure Heller's perfection 
of a security interest in Rock Wool's vehicles. Their 
breach of that duty estops them from seeking even partial 
discharge under the Guaranty. There is simply no precedent 
recognizing that a borrower can, when having knowledge of 
his lender's failure to properly perfect its security 
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interest, purposely withhold that knowledge and later rely 
on it as a defense to payment. 
5. There is no evidence that Heller breached any duty 
of good faith to the Ekins in seeking to enforce the 
Guaranty. None of the bases on which the district court 
relied in support of that conclusion — Heller's detection 
of misleading errors in Rock Wool's aging schedules/ 
Heller's use of notices to Rock Wool's account debtors, and 
Heller's filing of a complaint in supposed violation of the 
Subordination Agreement — constitute breaches of the 
obligation of good faith imposed on parties to a contract. 
6. The trial court improperly admitted the testimony 
of an expert who had neither personal knowledge nor was 
asked to assume intelligible hypothetical facts on which to 
base his opinion of the value of a number of Rock Wool's 
motor vehicles. The court allowed the expert to base his 
opinions of the vehicles' value on scanty hand-written notes 
taken by another person which described in general and 
primitive terms the perceived condition of those vehicles. 
The clearly defective foundation for the ensuing expert 
opinion violates Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
the cases interpreting that rule. 
7. There is no credible evidence that Heller impaired 
Rock Wool's inventory in an amount of $25f000 or any other 
amount. The value of that inventory/ as reflected in Rock 
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Wool's own bankruptcy schedulesf was almost $10,000 less 
than the value given at trial. Thereforef even if Rock Wool 
failed to derive even a single penny from the sale of that 
inventory, Rock Wool's maximum loss would have been no more 
than $15f888.26 (the value reflected in the bankruptcy 
schedules) — not $25,000. 
8. The district court erred in awarding the Ekins any 
portion of their claimed attorneys' fees. Obviouslyf to the 
extent this court reverses the district court's 
determination that the Ekins are "exempted" from liability 
under the Guarantyf the Ekins would cease to be the 
"prevailing party" for purposes of taxing attorneys' fees as 
costs. Moreover
 f even if this court upholds all or a 
portion of the judgment, it is nevertheless clear that the 
district court erred by failing to allocate the attorneys' 
fees in the manner required by California law. 
9. The record establishes numerous ex parte 
communications between the trial judge and the Ekins' 
counsel. The presence of those unauthorized communications 
constitutes an irregularity in the court's proceedings which 
prevented Heller from having a fair trial. The court's 
refusal to grant Heller a new trial constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. This court should direct a new trial at which 
Heller can present its substantive claims without the taint 
of bias or the appearance of bias. 
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ARGUMENT I 
The District Court's Interpretation 
Of The Guaranty Agreement Presents 
A Question Of Law On Which 
This Court Owes No Deference To 
The District Court 
This court has repeatedly recognized that: 
"The interpretation of contract language 
presents us with a question of law, on which 
we owe no deference to the trial court's 
construction, but are free to make our own 
independent interpretation." Wade v. Utah 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 700 P.2d 1093, 1095 
(Utah, 1985). 
Accord, Bradshaw v. . Burningham, 671 P.2d 196 (1983); 
Deschler v. Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co., 663 P.2d 
97, 98 (Utah, 1983); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 
(Utah, 1980). 
In this case, the district court determined that the 
Guaranty was devoid of any language creating a waiver of the 
Ekins' right to claim impairment of collateral. (R. 
1074). In reviewing that determination, this court is 
entitled to examine the plain language of the Guaranty and 
independently interpret it without deference to the district 
court's conclusions. 
ARGUMENT II 
Under The Guaranty, The Ekins 
Explicitly Waived The Defense Of 
Impairment Of Collateral 
The Guaranty provides that: 
"[Heller] shall not be required to prosecute 
collection, enforcement or other remedies 
against the debtor [Rock Wool], or against 
any person liable on any said . . . agree-
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mentsf obligation indebtedness or liability 
so guaranteed/ or to enforce or resort to any 
security/ liensf collateral or other rights 
or remedies thereto appertaining, before 
calling on [the Ekms] for payment; nor shall 
[the Ekins1] liability in any way be released 
or affected by reason of any failure or delay 
on [Heller's J part so to do." (Emphasis 
added). 
The identical Guaranty was interpreted in Walter E. 
Heller & Company v. Coxy 343 F.Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
In that case, the court held that under the guaranty the 
guarantor M . . . is not released or discharged by virtue of 
any lack of diligence with respect to or release or 
impairment off collateral by a secured creditor." Ld. at 
526. Similarly/ in the case of Walter E. Heller & Company/ 
Inc. v. Wilkersonf 627 P.2d 773 (Colo. App. 1981)f the court 
endorsed the very proposition advanced by Heller in this 
case: "under the terms of the agreement [the very Guaranty 
at issue in this case]/ the defendants [guarantors] could 
not compel Heller to go against the security." ^d. at 
775. 
Nothing in the California Civil Code3 changes that 
result. While Section 2819 of the Code provides that/ "[a] 
surety is exonerated . . . if by any act of the creditor/ 
without the consent of the surety/ the original obligation 
The Loan Agreement, the Guaranty and the underlying 
security agreements provide that all disputes 
thereunder shall be governed by California law. 
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of the principal is altered in any respectf or the remedies 
or rights of the creditor against the principal in respect 
thereto, in any way impaired or suspended/' it is clear that 
in the Guaranty the Ekins knowingly gave their consent and 
waived the defense of impairment of collateral. 
The established common law rule in California is that: 
"A surety is not exonerated from 
liability by a change in a contract 
between the principal and the creditor 
which is made with his consent." 
Mitchell & Tire Co. v. Bentel, 184 Cal. 
315, 323, 193 P. 770 (1920). 
As the later California case of Bloom v. Bender, 313 P.2d 
568 (Cal., 1957), observed, "the logical corollary to this 
statute [§ 2819] is the exception above noted; i.e. where 
the surety consents to an alteration of the original 
obligation of the principal or the impairment or suspension 
of any right of the creditor's rights or remedies against 
the principal, the surety is not exonerated." Id. at 572. 
As the court further observed, if effective consent to the 
change in the obligation of a principal will prevent the 
otherwise resultant discharge of the surety, such consent 
may be given in advance of the alteration of the principal's 
obligation as well as at or after the time of such act., Id. 
at 573. 
The California Civil Code is consistent with the 
California Uniform Commercial Code (whose provisions 
relating to the release of guarantors who are "parties to 
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the instrument" apply by analogy)• Section 3-606 of the 
California Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that a 
guarantor may, and in the context of standard commercial 
dealings often doesf consent to impairment of collateral. 
Official Comment 2 to § 3606 addresses the issue of consent: 
"Consent may be given in advance, and is 
commonly incorporated in the instrument; 
or it may be given afterward. It 
requires no consideration, and operates 
as a waiver of the consenting party's 
right to claim his own discharge." 
As noted above, the Ekins' waiver of their rights to 
complain about the manner in which Heller conducted itself 
with respect to the taking, perfecting or disposing 
collateral is compellingly comprehensive and far reaching. 
In fact, their waiver is so unequivocal that Heller is not 
even required to enforce or resort to any security before 
looking to the Ekins for payment. Therefore, the Ekins have 
flatly consented in advance to impairment in the manner 
contemplated by Official Comment 2. Numerous case have 
validated guaranty agreements under which the guarantor has 
consented in advance to such impairment. 
The recent California case of American Security Bank v. 
Clarno, 151 Cal. App. 3d 874, 199 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984), is 
factually indistinguishable from the case at bar. There, 
the sole shareholders of a corporation guaranteed the 
corporation's note to American Security Bank. The 
shareholders1 guaranties were secured by deeds of trust on 
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their residences. The corporation's note was also secured 
by a security interest in the corporation's accounts, 
inventory and equipment. In addition, the corporation's 
wholly-owned subsidiary pledged its assets to the bank as 
security for the loan. However, the bank failed to perfect 
its security interest in that security. 
After deciding that the shareholders could not invoke 
the impairment of collateral provisions of Section 3606 of 
the Commercial Code, the court then considered whether Civil 
Code Section 2819 offered the shareholders any relief from 
their guarantor liability. As in the present case, the 
shareholders had executed guarantees expressly allowing the 
bank in part: 
" (i) To enter into any agreement of 
forebearance with respect to all or any part 
of the Liabilities, or with respect to all or 
any part of the collateral, and to change the 
terms of any such agreements; 
(ii) To forebear from calling for 
additional collateral to serve any of the 
Liabilities or to secure any obligation 
comprised in the collateral; 
(iii) To consent to the substitution, 
exchange or release of all or any part of the 
collateral . . . . " Id. at 880, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. at 130-31. 
The court held that the above language constituted a 
waiver of the shareholders' rights under Section 2819. The 
court was unwilling to impose upon the bank a duty to 
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perfect the security interest absent an express agreement to 
do so. Finding no such agreement, the court stated that: 
"No case requires a creditor to acquire every 
bit of security possible prior to imposing 
liability on a surety. Such a ruling would 
throw commercial transactions and suretyship 
law into utter chaos. We emphatically 
decline to rewrite these laws. :Ed. at 883, 
197 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 
This court has reached the same conclusion. In 
Continental Bank v. Utah Security Mortgager 701 P.2d 1095 
(Utah 1985), several individuals executed a guaranty 
agreement which provided in pertinent part that: 
"[Continental Bank] shall not be required to 
proceed first against [Utah Mortgage] or any 
other person, firm or corporation or against 
any collateral security held by it before 
resorting to the guarantor[s] for payment; 
and the liability of the guarantor[s] shall 
not be affected, released or exonerated by 
release or surrender of any security held for 
the payment of any of the debts hereinbefore 
mentioned . . . " Id. at 1097. 
The court held that that language (which is practically 
identical to the waiver provisions contained in the Guaranty 
at issue in this case) constituted an express waiver of any 
defense based on impairment of collateral. Accordingly, the 
court held that the bank's failure to perfect the security 
interest in the trust deeds and stock pledged by the 
corporate borrower did not release the guarantors from 
liability under their guaranties. 
Identical conclusions have been reached in an extensive 
series of cases. American Bank of Commerce v. Covolo, 17 
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U.C.C. Rptr. 1052f 1058 ("Where a guarantor or surety 
expressly and unequivocably consents to a waiver or release 
of its rights in the collateral/ he will not be heard to 
complain of the failure of the creditor to perfect the 
security interest therein in the first instance."); 
Executive Bank of Ft. Lauderdale v. Tighe, 32 U.C.C. Rptr. 
894, 898-99 (N.Y. Ct. of App. 1981) (" . . . a guarantor may 
consent to impairment of collateral and, as is noted in 
U.C.C. Official Comment 2, such consent 'operates as a 
waiver of the consenting party's right to claim his own 
discharge.'"); Etelson v. Suburban Trust Co., 9 U.C.C. Rptr. 
1371, 1373 (Md. 1971) (" . . . the [guarantors] by agreeing 
to the broad language of the endorsement limited the 
protection to which they might have otherwise been entitled 
under the U.C.C. It would be illogical to rule that the 
bank had a duty to file the financing statement and its 
failure to do so released the endorsers, when under the 
endorsement it could have released the collateral with 
impunity."); Nat'1 Acceptance Co. of America v. Demes, 24 
U.C.C. Rptr. 197, 201 (N. Dis. 111. 1977) ("We cannot escape 
the conclusion that, however justifiable defendant's 
expectations that the finance company should proceed with 
care to perfect its security interest properly, these 
expectations were not protected by the guaranty agreement 
they signed."); Commerce Bank of St. Louis v. Wright, 37 
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U.C.C. Rptr. 502, 508 (Mo. 1982) ("Neither the defense of 
release or agreement not to sue the corporation, nor the 
defense of impairment of collateral is available to the 
guarantors since they consented, by the unambiguous terms of 
the guaranty set out above, to pay the debt regardless of 
any release of the corporation or use of the collateral."); 
Wilson v. Baxley State Bank, 29 U.C.C. Rptr. 1550 (Ga. 1980) 
("The guaranty agreement provided that the 'bank is 
authorized to release collateral, substitute 
collateral . . . without any notice to undersigned without 
affecting the liability of undersigned hereunder.1 Such a 
release operates as a waiver of the consenting party1s right 
to claim his own discharge."). 
It is clear in this case that the Ekins have similarly 
waived in advance their right to complain of Heller's 
alleged impairment of collateral. It is difficult to 
imagine a waiver more explicitly or clearly given: a clear 
recognition by the Ekins that Heller shall not be required " 
to enforce or resort to any security, liens, 
collateral or other rights for remedies thereto appertaining 
before calling on [the Ekins] for payment; nor shall [the 
Ekins1] liability in any way be released or affected by 
reason of any failure or delay on [Heller's] part so to 
do." (App. ii, Emphasis added). 
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By examining and signing the Guaranty, the Ekins 
voluntarily and knowingly waived their rights to complain of 
Heller's failure to perfect its security interest in a 
portion of Rock Wool's collateral. The district court's 
initial refusal to consider that issue and its later 
misinterpretation of the Guaranty constitute clear error 
requiring reversal of its judgment. 
ARGUMENT III 
The Ekins, As Controlling Shareholders 
Of Rock Wool, Are Precluded As A Matter 
Of Law From Claiming A Discharge Under The Guaranty 
The Ekins own 99.67% of all the issued and outstanding 
capital stock of Rock Wool. (Tr. 1672). Under established 
lawf their position as dominating controlling shareholders 
of Rock Wool precludes them from asserting rights of 
discharge otherwise available to independent third party 
guarantors not affiliated with the principal debtor. 
Numerous cases have held that " . . . where the 
guarantor controls the debtor it will not be discharged, 
absent an express agreement to the contrary, by the failure 
of the creditor to perfect its lien in the collateral." 
Leslie Fay, Inc. v. Rich, 478 F.Supp. 1109, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979), 28 UoC.C. Rptr. 830, 836. In that case, the 
principal debtor was a subsidiary of the corporate 
guarantor. The guarantor alleged that the plaintiff lessor 
had impaired the guarantor's rights of subrogation by 
failing to properly perfect its security interest in certain 
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leasehold fixture improvements. The court assumed for 
purposes of argument that where an independent third party 
guarantees an obligation as an accommodation to the debtor, 
" . . . it seems reasonable for that party to rely on the 
expectation that a businessman/creditor will act responsibly 
and make at least a reasonable effort to secure its 
collateral under the U.C.C.f thereby protecting the 
guarantor's subrogation interest." The court then observed 
that: 
"This case, thoughf presents a 
situation entirely different from that 
in which an independent third party 
guarantees a debt. Several courts, 
including a New York court, have 
recognized that where the guarantor 
controls the debtor it will not be 
discharged, absent an express agreement 
to the contrary, by the failure of the 
creditor to perfect its lien in the 
collateral. [Citations omitted]. 
This rule is sound. In such a 
situation, the guarantor as a principal 
party to the negotiations resulting in 
the ultimate transaction is in a strong 
position to include in the agreement 
specific conditions upon which guaranty 
is based. In this case the guaranty was 
unconditional despite the fact that the 
parties outlined, in great detail, 
conditions concerning the collateral . . 
in this context, the unconditional 
guaranty must be read at face value." 
The court in Rich cited with approval the case of 
Nation Wide v. Scullin, 256 F.Supp. 929, 932, 3 U.C.C. Rptr. 
724 (Dist. Ct. N.J. 1966): 
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"These defendants were not cast in 
the familiar role of accommodation 
endorsers, or sureties, a status which 
would entail less stringent 
responsibilities in the eyes of the 
law. Rather they were businessmen — 
the principal anchors, both as 
individuals and their corporate alter 
ego — who undertook to perform this 
arrangement. It is reasonable to 
assume, nothing contra wise on the 
record, that they were possessed of some 
measure of business acumen, when they 
undertook to guarantee their company's 
contract performance. 
The paramount obligation here is 
the guaranty contract of defendants, the 
consideration for which was the contract 
of the corporation . . . their 
obligation is unconditional." 
The Rich court accordingly concluded that, "defendants 
should not be allowed to evade their personal obligations by 
virtue of corporate acts that were fully within their 
control . . . " Id. at 837. 
In the instant case, the Ekins executed the Loan 
Agreement, the trust deed and the three separate security 
agreements in their respective capacities as corporate 
president and secretary of Rock Wool. Between them they 
held and continue to hold all but a negligible portion of 
Rock Wool's capital stock. Heller's loan advances were 
essential to the preservation of their interest in Rock Wool 
— a corporation on which they relied as their primary 
source of income. Their de facto domination of Rock Wool 
precludes them from asserting the status of an independent 
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disinterested third party guarantor able to claim discharge 
by resort to common law and U.C.C. suretyship defenses. 
The district court's failure to so hold constitutes 
reversible error. 
ARGUMENT IV 
The Ekins, As Controlling Shareholders Of Rock Wool, 
Had An Affirmative Duty To Ensure Heller's 
Perfection Of A Security Interest In Rock Wool's Vehicles 
And Their Breach Of That Duty Estops Them From 
Seeking Even Partial Discharge Under The Guaranty 
The extraordinary identity of interest between the 
Ekins and Rock Wool carries an additional consequence. It 
imposes on the Ekins an affirmative duty to protect and 
preserve the security pledged by Rock Wool to Heller and 
thereby preserve their rights of subrogation. As shown 
below, any breach of that duty precludes them from obtaining 
a discharge from the Guaranty. 
The principle that a guarantor who possesses a 
substantial identity of interest with the corporate borrower 
cannot assert suretyship defenses otherwise available to an 
independent guarantor is so widely recognized that one court 
has stated that it could find " . . . no reported case where 
a person who has an interest in the transaction can avail 
himself of this defense [discharge or release] where there 
has been a failure to file a financing statement." Mikanis 
Trading Corp. v. Lowenthal, 22 U.C.C. Rptr. 1000 (N.Y. 
1977). 
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The courts have consistently held that in such 
situations the guarantors not only have a substantial 
interest in protecting the security but also have an 
opportunity at least equal to that of the creditor to insure 
that the creditor's security interest in the collateral is 
duly perfected. Mikanis Trading Corp. v. Lowenthal, supra, 
at 1001, ("defendant's argument [that he is discharged from 
liability on his guaranty by reason of the lender's failure 
to perfect a security interest in collateral pledged by the 
borrower] overlooks the fact that he, as well as plaintiff, 
had a substantial interest in protecting the security as 
against third parties in light of his guaranty. Defendant, 
as well as plaintiff, could have seen to the filing under 
the Code."); Tampa Bay Bank v. Loveday, 17 U.C.C. Rptr. 
1247, (Tenn. 1975) ("In the case at bar the defendant [as 
chief executive officer of the corporate borrower] was not 
only in an equal position, but we find that she was in a 
more superior position to protect the collateral then was 
the plaintiff bank."). Accord, Rushton v. U M & M Credit 
Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rptr. 1078 (Ark. 1968); Union Bank y^ 
Kruger, 1 Wash. App. 622, 463 P.2d 273 (1969). 
The record establishes that between December, 1979 and 
December 7, 1983 (the date on which Rock Wool filed its 
petition in bankruptcy), Rock Wool, through the Ekins, sold 
anywhere between five and fifteen motor vehicles having an 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
estimated fair market value of at least $31,700. (Tr. 1716-
20, 1811-16). Heller could locate no evidence suggesting 
that Rock Wool remitted any portion of those sales proceeds 
to Heller. Even charitably assuming that Heller was 
negligent in failing to perfect its security interest in the 
motor vehicles, it is clear that the Ekins had the last 
clear chance to avoid any loss by apprising Heller of its 
need to perfect and thereby ensure its ability to receive 
proceeds derived from the sale of the vehicles. Under 
either analysis — duty to mitigate or last clear chance — 
the Ekins are plainly estopped from claiming any impairment 
of collateral. 
The district court's consequent failure to grant Heller 
a credit in the amount of $31,700 against any loss claimed 
by the Ekins constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT V 
The District Court's Finding That 
Heller Breached Its Obligation Of 
Good Faith In The Enforcement Of 
The Guaranty Is Clearly Erroneous 
The district court found that Heller breached its 
obligation of good faith to the Ekins in its enforcement of 
the Guaranty. That supposed breach consisted of the 
following incidents: 
(i) Heller's creation of an "insuperable 
negative balance" in Rock Wool's loan availability 
through its detection of a misleading error in 
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Rock Wool's account receivable aging schedules (R. 
1075); 
(ii) Heller's use of direct notices sent to 
the account debtors identified by Rock Wool itself 
(Id.); 
(iii) Heller's filing of a complaint without 
advance notice or demand which sought the 
appointment of a receiver to take possession of 
the Ekins1 home " . . . all at a time when Heller 
was bound by contract not to take action against 
the Ekins1 home." (Id.) 
Even charitably assuming the existence of a duty of good 
faith the record discloses no evidence establishing the 
existence of an actionable breach. 
A. Heller's Detection Of A Misleading Error In Rock Wool's 
Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule. 
The record establishes that in mid-January, 1983f 
Heller's internal auditors discerned an error in the 
accounts receivable aging schedule submitted by Rock Wool to 
Heller for the purpose of reflecting the nature, extent and 
age of Rock Wool's accounts receivables. (See, pp. 9-10f 
supra). On January 25, 1983f Heller advised Rock Wool of 
that problem and of the consequent increase in its negative 
loan availability. (Exhibit "X"). Notably, Rock Wool's 
loan availability had, since November 12, 1982, fluctuated 
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between a negative $631.28 and a negative $7,589.30. (Tr. 
1401-04, 1418). 
Therefore, Heller's detection of the errors in Rock 
Wool's aging schedule simply increased the Rock Wool's loan 
availability from a negative $7,589.30 to a negative 
$52,000. It did not, as the district court found, create an 
"insuperable negative balance." (Finding of Fact No. 9; R. 
1075). That balance had been negative for the ten weeks 
preceding Heller's adjustment. (Tr. 1401-04, 1418). Thus, 
there is no factual support in the record for a finding that 
Heller's contractually authorized adjustment of the amount 
of Rock Wool's loan availability did anything other than 
increase its negative balance. Rock Wool had, by its own 
inability to effect collection of its accounts, created its 
own negative loan availability. 
B. Heller's Use Of Notices To Rock Wool's Debtors. 
On February 7, 1983, Heller's account analyst noted 
that Heller had received no collections from Rock Wool's 
account debtor since January 31 and had received only $9,031 
from those debtors during the entire month of January. 
(Exhibit "S"; Tr. 1289). Accordingly, on the following day, 
Heller sent to each of the account debtors reflected in the 
last monthly report sent to it by Rock Wool, a notice 
requesting each account debtor to remit directly to Heller 
all monies owing to Rock Wool. (Exhibit "T"; Tr. 1315-17, 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1342, 1345). The use of such notices is expressly 
authorized in the Loan Agreement. (See, Exhibit "A"
 f 11 
6). Moreover, § 9-502(1) of the California Uniform 
Commercial Code provides that: 
"When so agreed and in any event on default 
the secured party is entitled to notify an 
account debtor or the obligor on an 
instrument to make payment to him whether or 
not the assignor was theretofore making 
collections on the collateral . . . . " 
The district court clearly erred in determining that 
Heller's use of notices to Rock Wool's debtors violated its 
duty of good faith owed to the Ekins. 
C. Heller's Inadvertant Overstatement Of The Amount Sued 
For And Its Filing Of A Complaint In The Face Of The 
Subordination Agreement. 
Heller's original complaint sought to recover the 
principal sum of $116,700.43 plus after-accrued interest, 
costs and attorneys' fees. (R. 2-14). Heller later filed 
an amended complaint to reduce the amount of Heller's claim 
(R. 303-39) because the amount sought in its original 
complaint was inadvertantly overstated. (Tr. 1290-92). 
Heller's never purposely overstated the sought amount. (Tr. 
1385, 1408). 
In filing its complaint, Heller was aware of the 
Subordination Agreement which it had entered into with 
Valley Bank. The Subordination Agreement provided in 
pertinent part that: 
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"In consideration of the credit extended to 
borrower [the Ekins] by the Bank [Valley 
Bank], the undersigned [Heller] hereby 
subordinates its security interest in the 
described security [the real property 
described in Heller's trust deed] to the 
above security interests of the Bank. The 
Bank may extend, modify or renew the so 
secured obligation without affecting this 
subordination. The undersigned agrees not to 
demand, receive, accept or otherwise realize 
on the security or the security interest or 
to take any direct or indirect action to 
obtain or realize such security until such 
time as Bank is paid in full. The 
undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to 
Bank immediately upon receipt any of the 
described security or proceeds thereof." 
(Emphasis added). (See, Exhibit MDDM; App. 
iii) . 
Heller's accounts analyst, James E. Hillman, testified that 
Heller filed its complaint in reliance on the last sentence 
of the Subordination Agreement which contemplated that upon 
sale of the property any proceeds in an amount up to and 
including the loan balance owing by the Ekins to Valley Bank 
would be remitted to Valley Bank and any surplus could be 
retained by creditors of the Ekins (such as Heller). (Tr. 
1407-08, 1409). 
There is simply no basis for concluding that the 
Subordination Agreement precluded Heller, as a matter of 
law, from filing a complaint to judicially foreclose its 
trust deed. The last sentence of the Subordination 
Agreement expressly contemplates such an occurrence. The 
district court's tortured interpretation to the contrary 
should be reversed as a matter of law. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
The District Court Improperly Admitted 
The Testimony Of An Expert Who Had Neither 
Personal Knowledge Nor Intelligible 
Assumed Hypothetical Facts On Which 
To Base His Opinion 
At trial, the Ekins adduced the testimony of an 
appraiser for the purpose of establishing the fair market 
value of several motor vehicles in which Heller had not 
perfected a security interest. (See, Tr. 1482-1501). 
However, in purporting to render his opinion of the 
vehicles1 value, the appraiser acknowledged that he 
11
 . . . did not see the vehicles." (Tr. 1485). Instead, 
the appraiser based his opinion on a description of the 
vehicles prepared three years earlier by David Ekins. (Tr. 
1485-89). Heller's counsel timely interposed an objection 
to the testimony, (Tr. 1487-89) but the court allowed the 
testimony. The appraiser indicated that it was unusual for 
him to render an opinion of value without having actually 
inspected the physical condition of the subject of his 
appraisal. (Tr. 1491). In addition, he acknowledged the 
tenuousness of that procedure: 
Question by And having said that, is it fair to say 
Mr. Anderson: that the perception of a lay person 
[such as David Ekins] of the condition 
of a vehicle may well be different than 
the perception of a qualified appraiser 
such as yourself? 
Answer: There is no question„ Everybody would 
look at things differently. 
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Question; 
Answer: 
And they would use different words to 
describe the condition, would they 
not? 
Oh, yes. 
Question: 
Answer: 
Question: 
Answer: 
[And] regardless of the subjective 
allowance that you may have made for 
that condition, itfs a fact, is it not, 
that the condition — that the language 
utilized by a lay person to describe a 
condition may well be different than the 
language utilized by an appraiser? 
That's true. 
And you have no way of verifying whether 
Mr. Ekins1 perception of the condition 
comports with yours? 
No. 
(Tr. 1499, 1500). 
The proffered testimony is absolutely inadmissible 
under Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides 
that: 
"The facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of 
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence." 
A vitally important precondition to the admittance of 
expert evidence is the showing of a proper foundation. The 
importance of a proper foundation has been stressed in 
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1979). In that 
case, this court stated that: 
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"The admissibility of [expert] evidence 
depends in large measure upon the foundation 
laid. The expertise of the witness, his 
degree of familiarity with the necessary 
factsf and logical nexus between his opinion 
and the facts adduced must be established. 
When such a foundation is laid, Rule 56 
[which is the predecessor of the presently 
enacted Rule 703] of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence makes an expert's opinion 
admissible, even though it embraces an 
ultimate issue." 
A fortiori, failure to lay a proper foundation for the 
witness1 opinion requires exclusion of that opinion. As 
this court noted in Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 
Utah 2d 226, 408 P.2d 189 (1974): 
"The witness must testify as to the facts 
upon which he bases his opinion and the facts 
should be related to the opinion. Otherwise, 
the testimony would be of little assistance 
to the court and jury, and there would be no 
way of testing the validity of the 
opinion." (Emphasis added). _Id. at 1331-
32. 
In this case, there is no way the appraiser had any 
"degree of familiarity" with the necessary facts since he 
readily acknowledged that the language employed by David 
Ekins to describe the vehicles could well have been 
substantially different than his own. Therefore, there are 
no credible "facts" on which his opinion is based. 
Similarly, there can be no "logical nexus" between the 
opinion and the adduced facts since there is no way of 
determining with any clarity or precision just exactly what 
those facts are. In simple terms, there is simply no way 
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for Heller to test and plumb-bob the validity of the 
appraiser's opinion since it is impossible to know whether 
the standards used by David Ekins to describe the condition 
of the vehicles comported even remotely with those used by 
the appraiser in rendering his opinion. 
The Ekins1 clear failure to lay a proper foundation for 
that testimony required the district court to exclude it. 
Its failure to do so constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT VII 
There Is No Credible"Evidence 
Supporting A Finding That Heller 
Impaired Rock Wool's Inventory 
In An Amount of $25,000 Or Any 
Other Amount 
David Ekins (son of the Ekins) testified that Rock Wool 
was forced to sell its inventory at a loss of $25,000.00. 
(Finding of Fact No. 6; R. 1074). Mr. Ekins lied: on Rock 
Wool's bankruptcy schedules, which he prepared and signed 
under penalty of perjury, he represented that the total 
market value of all of Rock Wool's "inventory and supplies" 
was the sum of $15,888.26. (See, Exhibit "Y", specifically 
attachment to Schedule B-2(k) and Exhibit "SS", p. 3). 
Therefore, even if he failed to derive even a single penny 
from the sale of that inventory, Rock Wool's maximum loss 
would have been $15,888.26 — some $10,000.00 less than the 
amount to which he testified. Clearly, the inventory and 
supplies fetched some amount of monies which represent a 
portion of that figure. Therefore, there is no way Rock 
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Wool suffered any loss remotely approaching the figure to 
which he testified and which the district court adopted. 
ARGUMENT VIII 
The District Court Erred In Awarding 
The Ekms Any Portion Of Their Sought 
Attorneys' Fees 
The district court awarded the Ekins attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $63f718.38. (R. 1096-99). The purported 
basis for the recovery of such fees is Section 1717 of the 
California Civil Code which provides in pertinent part that: 
" (i) In any action on a contract, where the 
contract specifically provides thai-
attorneys' fees and costs, which are incurred 
to enforce the provisions of that contract7 
shall be awarded either to one of the parties 
or to the prevailing party, when the party 
who is determined to be the prevailing party, 
whether he or she is the party specified in 
the contract are notf shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to 
costs and necessary disbursements." 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, to determine the Ekins' eligibility for recovery 
of attorneys' fees under that statute, two threshold 
determinations must be made: (i) on which contract are the 
Ekins relying to support their claim for the recovery of 
attorneys' fees, and (ii) does that contract specifically 
provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees which are 
incurred to enforce that contract? The answer to the first 
question, namely, the identity of the contract thought to 
support the claim for attorneys' fees is the Guaranty and 
the Trust Deed. Those contracts are the only operative 
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instruments executed by the Ekins in connection with the 
transactions at issue in this case.4 Therefore, they are 
the sole documents on which the Ekins can rely to recover 
attorneys' fees in this case. 
Having established that it is the Guaranty and the 
Trust Deed which determine the Ekins1 right to recover 
attorneys1 feesf the next issue is whether the Guaranty 
specifically provides for the recovery of attorneys1 fees 
which are incurred to enforce the Guaranty itself as 
required by the statute. The only provision in the Guaranty 
relating to attorneys1 fees is as follows: 
" . . . we [the Ekins] also hereby jointly 
and severally agree on demand to reimburse 
you [Heller] and your assigns for all 
expenses, collection charges, court costs and 
attorneys' fees incurred in endeavoring to 
collect or enforce any of the foregoing 
against the debtor and/or undersigned or any 
other person or concern liable thereon." 
(Emphasis added). (See, Exhibit "F"; App. 
ii). 
That provision, then, allows Heller to recover attorneys' 
fees incurred for the purpose of collecting or enforcing 
obligations owing under the Loan Agreement and the 
underlying security agreements described in the preceding 
portion of that paragraph. The Guaranty nowhere provides 
The Loan Agreement and the underlying security 
agreements were, of course, executed by Rock Wool. The 
Ekins are not signatories to those agreements. 
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for the recovery of attorneys1 fees incurred in the 
enforcement of the Guaranty itself. Therefore, the 
statutory requirement that attorneys1 fees are recoverable 
only if they are incurred to enforce the provisions of that 
very contract has not been met. The district court's 
obvious failure to recognize that requirement resulted in an 
erroneous conclusion that the Ekins were entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees. 
Finally, the Ekins can seek to recover only those 
expenses which they can demonstrate are directly related to 
their obligations under the Guaranty and the Trust Deed. 
Recovery must be denied for any attorneys' fees expended in 
connection with any other matter in the case — such as 
declaratory judgment on the Subordination Agreement; issues 
related to Rock Wool's bankruptcy filing; matters respecting 
the prosecution of the counterclaim for damages; etc. In 
shortf any matter not directly referrable to their liability 
under the Guaranty or the Trust Deed is not taxable as a 
cost against Heller. Accordingly, the district court should 
be required to conduct further hearing to determine the 
precise allocation to be accorded any requested attorneys' 
fees. 
ARGUMENT IX 
The Trial Judge's Ex Parte Communications With The Ekins1 
Counsel Constitutes An Irregularity In Proceedings Which 
Prevented Heller From Having A Fair Trial 
No principle could be better settled than the 
proposition that a judge should refrain from ex parte 
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communications with counsel concerning any matter related to 
a pending proceeding. Canon 3A(4) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct could not be clearer: 
"A judge should . . . neither initiate 
nor consider ex parte or other communications 
concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding." 
Similarly, Disciplinary Rule 7-110(b) of the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibilityf with narrow exceptions, forbids 
such communications. 
For obvious reasons (including the happily infrequent 
occurrence of such contacts and the practical difficulty of 
detecting such abuses)/ there are few reported cases 
addressing the consequences of improper ex parte 
communications between the court and counsel. Those that 
do, however, decline to countenance or rationalize such 
conduct. For example, in Williams v. Williams, 249 P. 920 
(Okla. 1926), the record established that the trial judge 
had permitted the parties to bring the case to his attention 
in conversations outside the regular proceedings. In 
reversing the trial judge's refusal to disqualify himself, 
and in remanding for a new trial, the court noted as 
follows: 
"Our jurisprudence guarantees a fair and 
impartial trial to litigants in express 
terms. As the ultimate powers of the courts 
to enforce their judgment must be made to 
rest upon the public confidence and the good 
faith and integrity of the courts, it is 
implied, and is the concern of the courts 
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that a case not only be tried fairly in fact 
and in lawf but in such an atmosphere that 
neither party plausibly can point to grounds 
as a support for the charge that the judgment 
followed from prejudice or bias of the trial 
judge. 
* * * 
A judge can protect himself from such 
charges by forbidding anyone to discuss the 
case with him. The law provides means for 
punishing those who may persist in imposing 
upon the judge. We go no farther than to say 
that the trial judge should not have 
permitted the parties to discuss the case, or 
talk to him about the case, outside of a 
regular court proceeding. But having 
permitted the instance to occur, the 
application for disqualification ought to 
have been sustained." 
To the same effect are State v. Crismore, 213 P.2d 293 
(Okla. 1949) (If the petitioner had been able to establish 
that the judge discussed the merits of certain criminal 
matters with the District Attorney, disqualification would 
be ordered); Rosenfield v. Vosper, 195 P.2d 530 (Cal. 1948) 
(Absent an express agreement between all counsel to allow 
one of those counsel to discuss the merits of proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in chambers without 
the other counsel, new trial would be granted upon showing 
of prejudice.); In re Hasler, 447 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1969) 
(Where it was established that the judge conducted 
telephonic and written communications with the wife in a 
divorce proceeding before him without the knowledge of the 
husband, the judge was properly disbarred.) 
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In this case, the record clearly establishes that the 
trial judge and the Ekins1 counsel engaged in at least four 
separate telephone conversations and apparently one meeting 
concerning the merits of this case. The time slips of the 
Ekins1 counsel attached to the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees 
dated March 17, 1986 (R. 878-1019), clearly disclose that 
the trial judge and the Ekins1 counsel conducted telephone 
conversations on July 26, 1984, on July 31, 1984, on 
August 1, 1984 and on December 2, 1985. (See, App. iv). 
In addition to those telephone conversation (at least 
two of which extended for at least 12 minutes), there are 
two other entries in the time slips strongly suggesting the 
occurrence of direct contact between the court and the 
Ekins1 counsel: On June 11, 1984, the Ekins1 counsel 
personally delivered certain unspecified pleadings to "Judge 
Dee." (See, App. v) . In addition, on July 5, 1984, the 
Ekins1 counsel either traveled to the court to contact 
"clerk or judge" or tried to contact "clerk or judge," again 
indicating his brazen belief that he was entitled, as a 
matter of course, to contact the court with respect to this 
case in the absence of Heller's counsel. (See, App. vi). 
The trial judge's explanation of why supposed 
scheduling matters required 12 minutes of discussion was 
that he may have placed the Ekins' counsel on hold while he 
looked for the file. (See, App. vii). However, the 
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affidavit of the Ekins' counsel which seeks to explain and 
justify those ex parte conferences makes no mention of that 
fact. (R. 1154-62). 
It is impossible to conceive of any conduct more at 
variance with the principle of evenhanded, impartial and 
fair meteing out of justice. Heller — as a California 
corporation who made substantial loan advances which the 
court determined need not be repaid — has now been informed 
that the Utah judge who made that decision has chatted at 
length with the borrowers1 counsel concerning the case in 
the absence of Heller's counsel. Surelyf despite whatever 
explanation or rationalization is advanced for that conductf 
Heller can never be convinced that it had a full and fair 
adjudication of its claims. Like any other litigant. Heller 
is entitled to a trial presided over by a judge whose 
impartiality cannot be questioned. 
Accordingly, this court should reverse the district 
court's order denying Heller's motion for new trial and 
enable Heller to litigate its claims with a trial judge 
whose impartiality cannot be questioned. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court should reverse the 
district court's judgment and either (i) enter judgment in 
favor of Heller as a matter of law, or (ii) remand to the 
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district court to retry this case in accordance with this 
court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of September, 1986. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
By Is/JtfiJU v / ftnthAM^ 
/C^rry D. Jones 
John T. Anderson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jj_ day of 
September, 1986, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing instrument were sent, postage prepaid in the 
United States mail, to the following: 
Earl D. Tanner, Sr., Esq. 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
# 
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 1 n _ . ACCOUNTS FINANCING SECURITY Avjflxxxyu:^ i 
December 27, 1979 
LIEN AND SECURITY INTEREST 
U . S . R o c k W o o l C o . . T n r . 
OK chief
 Pi«ce of biuinew is located * i l W. S e n i o r Way 
Numbs Street 
S a l t Lake Sail- T.akg Utah 84115 
Gty Count* Sute 
einafter called "Borrower", for valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby grants to WALTER E. HELLER 
iSTERN INCORPORATED, hereinafter called "Heller", a continuing general lien and security interest in all accounts receivable, instruments, 
ttei paper, general intangibles and contract rights (hereinafter collectively called "Accounts"; the obligors thereon being sometimes referred to 
'account debtor" or "account debtors"), now or hereafter owned or acquired by Borrower, however, the same shall arise or be acquired, and all proceeds 
I collections thereof, ail guaranties and other security therefor, all right, title and interest of Borrower in the merchandise which gave rise thereto, 
luding the right of stoppage in transit, all returned, rejected, rerouted or repossessed goods, the sale or lease of which shall have given rise to any 
ount or any such instruments or chattel paper (all, including the Accounts, hereinafter collectively called the "Collateral"), in the proceeds thereof 
I in all of Borrower's books and records relating to the Collateral. The lien and security interest of Heller (or, in those states in which the Uniform 
nmerciai Code has not become effeaive, the lien of Heller arising by the assignment to Heller of accounts (receivable) is to secure the payment 
1 performtnce of all liabilities and obligations of Borrower to Heller of every kind and description, direa, absolute or contingent, due or to become 
», whether now existing or hereafter arising hereunder or under any other agreement, document or instrument heretofore, now or hereafter executed 
I delivered by Borrower to Heller mmmdf^mi^ w*1 •W*******bmmmmri*mr***t*m*&*iU* or by operation of law, whether or not evidenced by 
' written agreement, document or instrument, including obligations to perform aas and refrain from taking aaion as well as obligations to pay money, 
luding, without limitation, those arising under: 
wentory Loan Security Agreement of even date herewith* 
lattel Mortgage Security Agreement of even date herewith. 
1 hereinafter called "Obligations"). 
WARRANTIES 
Borrower hereby represents and warrants to Heller, and covenants, as follows: 
a. All boob, records and documents relating to the Accounts tie and will be genuine and in all respects what they purport to be; the amount 
of the Account shown on the books and records of Borrower represented as owing or to be owing at maturity by each account debtor is and 
will be the correct amount actually owing or to be owing by such account debtor at maturity; each debtor liable upon the Accounts has and 
will hate capacity to contract; Borrower has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity or collectibility of any of the Accounts. 
b. If Borrower is a corporation, it is duly organized and existing under the laws of the sute of its incorporation, u set out above and is duly 
qualified and in good standing in every other state in which the nature of its business requires such qualification. 
c. The execution, delivery and performance hereof are not in contravention of law or of any indenture, agreement or undertaking to which 
Borrower is a party or by which it is bound and, if Borrower is a corporation, the same are within Borrower's corporate powers, have been 
duly authorized and are not in contravention of its chaster, by-laws, or other incorporation papers. 
d. At the time of assignment, each account receivable represents and will represent an undisputed, bona fide sale and delivery of sjoods or services 
rendered, or both, (or in the case of a contract right, represents and will represent an undisputed, bona Bdt agreement) and is not and will 
not be subject to any setoff, contra-daim, discount or condition of any nature, except as specified in writing on or before the delivery to Heller 
of schedules of assignment of accounts receivable; Borrower is, or, at the time of the assignment, will be the lawful owner of each Account 
and has unqualified right to assign and grant liens and security interests to Heller therein; Borrower will, with respect to each Account, deliver 
to Heller such pMpta as Heller may require, including, without limitation, the original delivery or other receipts and duplicate invoices. 
e. Borrower keeps and will continue to keep all of its books and records concerning accounts receivable and contract rights and all of its other 
books and records at its chief place of business, unless written notice to the contrary is given by Borrower to Heller. 
f. In addition to those shown in Paragraph 1. hereof. Borrower has places of business only at the following locations: 
HMMX 2320 Wall, Oflden, Utah 84401 
g. All information furnished by Borrower to Heller concerning Collateral and proceeds thereof, its financial condition or otherwise, is and will 
be complete, accurate and correct in all material respects at the time the same is furnished, 
h. Borrower has fully complied and will fully comply hereafter with the requirements of all applicable laws, federal, state and local, and all 
reserves provided upon Borrower's books and records are now and will be maintained hereafter in sufficient amounts to fully reflect ail 
liabilities which have accrued or may hereafter accrue. 
i. The Collateral and all goods giving rise thereto are and, for so long as any of Borrower's Obligations remain unpaid, will remain free of 
any liens, charges, security interests, encumbrances and adverse claims, except for the benefit of Heller, 
j . All covenants, representations and warranties contained in this Agreement shall be true and correct at the time of the execution of this 
Agreement and shall be deemed continuing. 
LOANS 
a. Heller agrees, during the continuance of this Agreement, to make loans and advances to Borrower, payable on demand, against those Accounts 
which Heller in its sole discretion considers eligible for borrowing, as follows: up to 6 5 «L
 0f the (see value of each Account shall be 
paid upon the acceptance thereof by Heller; the remainder, being not less than 3 5 «&
 0f said face value, shall be held by Heller as a 
reserve to secure the collection and payment of such Account and to secure the payment and performance of all Obligations. It is Heller s inten-
tion, in the absence of any default in the Obligations, to refund the amounts held as such reserve to Borrower to the extent that the Accounts, 
in respect of which such amounts are held, have been collected. The aggregate amount of Borrower's indebtedness and obligations to Heller 
incurred pursuant to this Aaxeement from time to time, shall be referred to hereinafter as "Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance." If Bor-
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rower's Receivables Loan Balance shall at any time exceed —2-5 % of the aggregate face value of said accepted Accounts, Heller may, but 
need not, require Borrower, upon demand, to pay such excess to Heller or may require Borrower to immediately deliver such additional security 
to Heller as may be satisfactory to Heller. 
i. To evidence such loans, Borrower shall, at Heller's request, execute and deliver to Heller promissory notes payable to Heller on demand, 
which said notes shall be in the amount of any portion or portions of Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance as at the time of Hellers request, 
up to the full extent thereof. Said notes shall provide for the payment to Heller of interest at the rate provided in Paragraph 3. (d) and 
shall be upon forms acceptable to Heller. The execution and delivery of such notes shall not constitute payment, satisfaction or release of 
any Obligation. 
. Checks received by Heller shall not constitute payment, but credit therefor, when earned, shall, solely for .the purpose of computing interest 
earned by Heller, be given as of the third calendar day after receipt, to allow for clearance. * P r i m d 4j 
I. Until all Obligations of Borrower to Heller are fully paid. Borrower will pay, monthly, as interest, A Q~<YpT,r»nr p^ a n n u m 
computed on the daily Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance, from the date accrued until the date paid. 
. Borrower agrees to pay interest in an amount not less than t •*• § ^ ^ ^ «U" per (XWKhl (yea')* irrespective of the amount of the 
daily Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance. 
. Heller shall give Borrower, each month, an extract or a statement of Borrower's account, prepared from Heller's records, which will con-
dusiveiy be deemed correct and accepted by Borrower, unless Borrower gives Heller a written statement of exceptions within thirty (30) days 
after receipt of such extract or statement 
mJRNED GOODS; INSTRUMENTS 
L Borrower will ohysically segregate all rejected, rerouted, repossessed or returned goods sold or delivered in respect of iny Account, will im-
mediately notify Heller thereof, will receive such merchandise in trust for Heller and will hold the same for such disposition as Heller may 
direct, or, at Heller's option, will promptly refund all advances, loans and extensions made on such Accounts, and will post written notice that 
they are subject to Heller's lien and security interest. 
). Borrower will deliver to Heller, endorsed to Heller, all instruments, chattel paper, guarantees or other documents immediately when received 
by Borrower as evidence or in payment of, or as security for, any of the Accounts, and will immediately transfer to Heller all security received 
for any of the Accounts. 
SPORTS; INSPECTION OF RECORDS; FURTHER ASSURANCE 
3orrower represents and agrees: 
L Ar all times to allow Heller, by or through any of its officers, agents, employees, attorneys and accountants, to possess, remove to the premises 
of Heller or any agent of Heller for so long as Heller may desire, to make full use thereof in aid of Heller's rights under this agreement, 
and to examine, audit and make extracts and copies from Borrower's books and ail other records, and, for said purposes or to aid Heller in 
the enforcement of any of its rights under this Agreement, to enter, to remain upon and, without cost to Heller, to use the premises of Bor-
rower or wherever the same may be found as often and for as long as Heller may desire. 
>. To furnish Heller an aged accounts receivable trial balance in such form and as often as Heller requires. 
:. To furnish to Heller, promptly upon request. Borrower's monthly statements of account with its customers. Borrower agrees that Heller 
may from time to time verify the validity, amount and any other matters relating to the Accounts by means of mail, telephone or otherwise, 
in the name of Borrower, Heller or such other name as Heller may choose. 
i. To do all things required by Heller in its sole judgment, in order more completely to vest in and assure to Heller its rights hereunder. The 
Accounts shall be assigned to Heller by written or printed instruments (hereinafter called "Schedules") in form acceptable to Heller, exe-
cuted in such quantities as Heller may require, but the lien and security interest of Heller hereunder shall not be limited in any way to or 
by the inclusion of Accounts within such Schedules and to the extent the terms and provisions hereof shall conflict with said Schedules 
this Agreement shall be controlling; in the event the Uniform Commercial Code applies to any of the Accounts, Borrower need not furnish 
Schedules relating thereto unless Heller shall so request; but Borrower's failure to execute and deliver such Schedules shall not limit the 
security interest granted to Heller hereinunder» 
e. To furnish to Heller within sixty (60) days from the end of its fiscal year, financial statements (including balance sheet, profit and loss 
figures and accountant's comments) for that year and, at Heller's request, will furnish to Heller financial statements for each month by the 
fifteenth day of the following month. All such annual financial statements shall be prepared by certified public accountants acceptable to Heller. 
f. Borrower will promptly notify Heller in writing of any change of its officers, directors and key employees, change of location of its principal 
offices, change of location of any of its assets (except the shipment, temporary storage or use in its manufacturing processes of inventory in 
the ordinary and normal course of Borrower's business), change of Borrower's name, death of any co-partner (if Borrower is a partnership), 
any sale or purchase out of the regular course of Borrower's business and any other material change in the business or financial affairs of 
Borrower. 
fOTICB OF ASSIGNMENT; COLLECTION; EXPENSES 
a. Borrower agrees that it will, "upon the request of Heller and in such form and at such" times as Heller shall request, give notice of the assign-
ment of or the granting of a security interest in all or any of the Accounts to the account debtors and that Heller may itselfgive such notice 
at any time ana from time to time in Heller's or Borrower's name, without noticeJo Borrower, requiring such account debtors to pay the 
account directly to Heller. 
b. Borrower irrevocably appoints Heller its true and lawful attorney, with power of substitution, in the name of Borrower or in the name of 
Heller or otherwise, for the use and benefit of Heller, but at the cost and expense of Borrower, without notice to Borrower or any of its 
representatives or successors, to repair, alter or supply goods, if any, necessary to fulfill in whole or in part the purchase order of any account 
debtor from which any Collateral has arisen; to demand, collect, receipt for and give renewals, extensions, discharges and releases of any 
Collateral; to institute and to prosecute legal and equitable proceedings to rerlize upon the Collateral; to settle, compromise, compound or 
adjust claims in respect of any Collateral or any legal proceedings brought in respect thereof; and generally to sell in whole or in part for 
cash, credit or property to others or to itself at any public or private sale, assign, make any agreement with respect to or otherwise deal with 
any of the Collateral as fully and completely u though Heller were the absolute owner thereof for all purposes. Borrower shall have no 
power to make any allowance or credit to any account debtor without Heller's written consent. 
c. Borrower also hereby irrevocably appoints Heller its true and lawful attorney, with power of substitution, to take control in any manner of 
any cash or non-cash items of payment or proceeds thereof; to endorse the name of Borrower upon any notes, acceptances, checks, 
drafts, money orders, bills of lading, freight bills, chattel paper or other evidences of payment or Collateral that may come into Heller's pos-
session; to sign Borrower's name on any invoices relating to any Accounts, on drafts against account debtors and notices to account debtors; 
to sign Borrower's name on any Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy against account debtors; to sign Borrower's name on any Notice of Lien, 
Claim of Mechanic's Lien or Assignment or Satisfaction of Mechanic's lien; and to do all other acts and things necessary, in Heller's sole 
judgment, to carry out this Agreement At any time or times when Borrower it in default hereunder, Heller shall have the right to enter 
upon Borrower's premises and to receive and open all mail directed to Borrower; Heller shall turn over to Borrower all of such mail not 
relating to Collateral. In the event of default, Heller shall have the right, in the name of Borrower, to notify the Post Office authorities to 
change the address for the delivery of mail addressed to Borrower to such address as Heller, may designate. Ml checks and other forms of 
:_._t _ — „ l A m A hmrmin hv Borrower shall be endorsed: "Pay to the order of Walter E. Heller & Company of California or »n 
•" " * • • : - ...«*«/rifino or hv rubber 
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Heller it its option, at any time by: i) siring notification of its assignment of, or lien ana^Purity interest in the Accounts to the account 
debtors, and no notice thereof to Borrower shall be required, or ii) giving notice of such revocation to Borrower. All moneys, checks, notes, 
drafts, other things of value and items of payment together with any and all relating vouchers, identifications, communications or other data 
received from account debtors collected or received by Borrower (or by any receiver, trustee, or successor in interest of Borrower, or by any 
person acting on behalf of Borrower) in reference to the Accounts shall belong to Heller and shall be immediately transmitted by Borrower 
to Heller at its office (or, if directed by Heller, deposited in Hellers account in a bank designated by Heller) in the original form in which 
the same are received and endorsed by Borrower. Borrower shall have no right and agrees not to commingle with its own funds or to use, 
divert or withhold any of the proceeds of any collections. Borrower hereby divests itselt of all dominion over the Accounts and the proceeds 
thereof and collections received thereon. Borrower shall make entries on its books and records in form satisfactory to Heller disclosing the 
absolute and unconditional assignment of Accounts to Heller and shall keep a separate account on its record boob of all collections received 
thereon. Borrower further agrees to advise Heller immediately of any claims or disputes arising with respect to any Account and of any occur-
rence that may in any way impair or affect any of the Accounts or tend to reduce the value thereof. Should any suit or proceeding be instituted 
by or against Heller or Borrower upon any of the Collateral or for the collection or enforcement of any Account, Borrower shall, without 
expense to Heller, make available such of its officers, employees, agents, books, records and files as Heller may deem necessary to make 
proper proof in Court. 
, Heller shall be entitled to recover from Borrower all damages sustained by Heller by reason of any misrepresentation, breach of warranty or 
breach of convenant of Borrower herein, expressed or implied, whether caused by the acts or defaults of Borrower, account debtors or others; 
and also all reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs, court reporter expenses, long distance telephone charges, telegram costs, collection expenses, 
accountants' fees, supervisory fees, expenses of attorneys, agents, officers, auditors, collectors, clerks and investigators for travel, lodging and 
food costs, traveling expenses, disbursements, and all other expenses which may be incurred by Heller in enforcing payment of any Account 
or of Borrower's Obligations in attempting to enforce payment, in realizing upon any Collateral, whether against any debtor. Borrower, 
Borrower's guarantors or others, in supervising the records and proper management and disposition of the collection of Accounts, in prose-
cuting or defending any proceeding arising from the efforts of Heller to recover any money or other thing of value or otherwise to enforce 
or protect any of Heller's rights hereunder. 
. Borrower agrees that, as to any insurance it now or hereafter may maintain covering risks of damage to or loss or destruction of its books 
and records, each such policy of insurance shall contain a loss payable clause in a form satisfactory to Heller naming Heller as payee and 
providing that all proceeds payable thereunder shall be payable in any event to Heller, unless written consent to the contrary is obtained 
from Heller; such proceeds shall be applied to Borrower's Receivables Loan Balance. Each such insurer shall agree that it will give Heller 
thirty (30) days written notice before any such policy shall be altered or cancelled and that no act or default of Borrower or any other person 
shall affect the right of Heller to recover thereunder in case of such damage, loss or destruction. Certified copies of such policies shall be 
delivered to Heller upon demand. 
NANCING STATEMENTS AND NOTICES OF ASSIGNMENT 
. At the request of Heller, Borrower will join with Heller in executing one or more Financing Statements and/or Notices Of Assignment of 
Accounts Receivable pursuant to any applicable law, in form satisfactory to Heller. 
>. Without the written consent of Heller, Borrower will not allow any Financing Statement or Notice Of Assignment of Accounts Receivable 
covering any Collateral or proceeds thereof to be on file in any* public office. 
HBNTS OF DEFAULT; ACCELERATION 
Ul Obligations shall, notwithstanding any time or credit allowed by any instrument evidencing a liability, become immediately due and payable 
ut notice or demand upon the occurrence of any of the following events of default: 
t. Borrower shall fail to make any payment or to perform any Obligation promptly when due; 
>. Any warranty, representation, or statement made or furnished to Heller by or in behalf of Borrower shall have been false in any material respect 
when made or furnished; 
:. Any event shall arise which results in the acceleration of the maturity of the indebtedness of Borrower to others under any indenture, agree-
ment or undertaking; 
d. There shall occur any loss, theft, damage, destruction, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the Collateral, or any levy, seamc or attachment 
thereof or thereon shall be made; 
e. Any of the following shall occur: dissolution, termination of existence, insolvency, business failure, appointment of a receiver for any part 
of the property of, assignment for the benefit of creditors by, or the commencement of any proceeding under any bankruptcy or insolvency 
law by or against Borrower or any guarantor or surety for Borrower, entry of a court order which enjoins, restrains or in any way prevents 
Borrower from conducting all or any part of its business affairs in the ordinary course, failure to pay any federal, state or local tax or other 
debt of Borrower unless the same is being contested in good faith, termination of guaranty by any guarantor of Borrower's indebtedness to 
Heller, whether under this Agreement or otherwise; it being expressly agreed that upon the happening of any event described herein, Bor-
rower and each of Borrower's guarantors and sureties hereunder having or acquiring knowledge thereof shall immediately give written notice 
of said event or fact to Heller; 
f. Heller shall determine, at any time or times hereafter, that it is insecure with respect to the performance by Borrower of all or any part of 
the Obligations; 
g. Borrower recognizes that, in the event it violates any of the warranties, covenants, terms and conditions of this agreement, no remedy at law 
will provide adequate relief to Heller and Borrower hereby agrees that Heller shall be entitled to temporary and permanent injunctive relief 
in case of any such breach without the necessity of proving actual damages. 
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
Upon the occurrence of any such event of default, and at any time thereafter, Heller shall have the rights and remedies of a secured party under 
California . Uniform Commercial Code and under any and all other laws in addition to the rights and remedies provided herein 
i any other instrument or paper executed by Borrower. All rights, powers and remedies hereunder or in any other instrument provided are cumu-
e and none is exclusive. 
ONE GENERAL OBLIGATION; CROSS COLLATERAL 
All loans and advances by Heller to Borrower under this Agreement and under all other agreements constitute one loan, and all indebtedness 
obligations of Borrower to Heller under this and under all other agreements, present and future, (including, without limitation, the documents 
d in Paragraph 1 hereof) consititute one general Obligation secured by collateral and security held and to be held by Heller hereunder and by 
« of all other agreements between Borrower and Heller now and hereafter existing. It is distinctly understood and agreed that all of the rights 
ieller contained in this Agreement shall likewise apply insofar as applicable to any modification of or supplement to this Agreement and to 
other agreements, present and future, between Heller and Borrower. 
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS 
All payments made by or in behalf of and all credits due Borrower may be applied and reapplied in whole or in part to any of Borrower's 
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TERMINATION 
This Agreement, on acceptance by Heller, shall continue until D e c e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 8 1 and from year 
•ar thereafter unless terminated as to future transactions by the giving of notice by registered mail by either party to the other, not less than 
f (30) days prior to any anniversary hereof. Borrower, at such termination date, shall make payment in full of all Obligations, whether evidenced 
istailment notes or otherwise, and whether or not all or any part of such Obligations are otherwise then due and payable by Borrower to Heller. 
it may terminate upon immediate notice at any time in the event Borrower commits any act of default enumerated in Paragraph 8. hereof. No 
inatioo of this Agreement shall in any way affect or impair any right of Heller arising prior thereto or by reason thereof, nor shall any such ter-
don relieve Borrower or any of the guarantors of any obligation to Heller under this Agreement or otherwise until ail of said obligations are 
paid and performed, nor shall any such termination affect any right or remedy of Heller arising from any such obligation, and all agreements, 
anties and representations of Borrower shall survive termination. 
BENEFITS OF THIS AGREEMENT 
This Security Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the beneht of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, successors, representatives 
assigns. 
GOVERNING LAW; SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION 
The validity, interpretation, enforcement and effect of this Security Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of C a l i f o r n i a 
owcr hereby consents to the jurisdiction of all courts in said State and hereby appoints _ 
le address is ^ 
orrower's agent for service of process in said State. 
SEPARABILITY 
In the event that any provision hereof be deemed to be invalid by reason of the operation of any law or by reason of the interpretation placed 
son br any court, this Agreement shall be construed as not containing such provision and the invalidity of such provision shall not affect the 
liry of any other provision hereof and any and all other provisions hereof which are otherwise lawful and valid shall remain in full force and effect. 
NOTICES AND PAYMENTS 
Any notice, payment or refund required hereunder or by reason of the application of any law shall be deemed to have been given by either 
r hereto when the same shall have been deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, at least five (3) calendar days prior to the 
n proposed thereby (except that notice of termination shall be given in the manner set forth in Paragraph 12. hereof), addressed: 
a. If to Borrower, at the address of Borrower specified in Paragraph 1. hereof, or to the latest address of Borrower of which Heller shall have 
received notice from Borrower; 
k if to Heller, at 300 Montgomery Street 
San Francisco, California 94104 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
If, at any time or times hereafter. Heller employs counsel for advice or other representation with respect to any Collateral or this Agreement or 
other agreement, document or instrument heretofore, now or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to Heller, or to commence, defend 
ntervene, file a petition, complaint, answer, motion or other pleadings, or to take any other action in or with respect to any suit or proceeding 
ting to this Agreement or any other agreement, instrument or document heretofore, now or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to Heller, 
o protect, collect, lease, sell, take possession of, or liquidate any of such Collateral, or to attempt to enforce any security interest or lien in any 
ateral, or to represent Heller in any litigation with respect to the affairs of Borrower or in any way relating to any of the Collateral, or to enforce 
rights of Heller or Obligations of Borrower, liabilities of Account Debtors, or any other person, firm, or corporation which may be obligated to 
ler by virtue of this Agreement or any other agreement, document or instrument heretofore, now or hereafter delivered to Heller by or for the 
£t of Borrower; then, in any of such events, all of the reasonable attorneys' fees arising from such services, and any expenses, costs and charges 
ting thereto, shall constitute additional Obligations of Borrower, secured by the Collateral, payable on demand. 
WAIVERS 
a. Borrower hereby waives any and all causes of action and claims which it may ever have against Heller as a result of any possession, collec-
tion or sale by Heller of any Collateral in the event of a default by Borrower, notwithstanding the effect of such possession, collection or 
sale upon the business of Borrower, and Borrower waives all rights of redemption, if any, it may have. 
b. The failure at any time or times hereafter to require strict performance by Borrower of any of the provisions, warranties, terms and condi-
tions contained in this Agreement or any other agreement, document or instrument now or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to 
Heller, shall not waive, affect or diminish any right of Heller hereafter to demand strict compliance and performance therewith and with 
respect to an? other provisions, warranties, terms and conditions contained in such agreements, documents and instruments, and any waiver 
of any default shall not waive or affect any other default, whether prior or subsequent thereto, and whether of the same or of a different type. 
None of the warranties, conditions, provisions and terms contained in this Agreement or any other agreement, document or instrument now 
or hereafter executed by Borrower and delivered to Heller shall be deemed to have been waived by any act or knowledge of Heller, its agents, 
officers or employees, but only by an instrument in writing, signed by an officer of Heller and directed to Borrower specifying such waiver. 
c Borrower waives any and all notice or demand which Borrower might be entitled to receive with respect to this Agreement by virtue of any 
applicable statute or law, and waives demand, protest, notice of protest, notice of default or dishonor, notice of payments and nonpayments, 
or of any default, release, compromise, settlement, extension, or renewal of all commercial paper, accounts, contract rights, instruments, chattel 
paper, guaranties, and otherwise, at any time held by Heller on which Borrower may in any way be liable, notice of nonpayment at maturity 
of any and all accounts, instruments or chattel paper, notice of any action taken by Heller unless expressely required by this Agreement and 
« hereby ratifies and confirms whatever Heller may do pursuant to this Acreement and agrees that Heller shall not be liable for any acts of 
commission or *"iimiHi or for any errors of judgment or mistakes of tact or law. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Agreement, which has been signed and delivered to Heller on the day and year first above written, shall not become effective until accepted 
Heller under the signature of its duly authorized officers at its address set forth herein in Paragraph 16. 
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GUARANTY ^ K K • 
SALTER E. HELLER WESTERN, INCORPORATED 
Date December 27
 l9JL2_ 
lemen: 
To induce you to purchase or otherwise acquire from. U. S. Rock Wool C o , , I n c . 
einafter called "Debtor") accounts receivable, conditional sale or lease agreements, chattel mortgages, drafts, notes, bills, acceptances, trust 
pts, contracts or other obligations or choses-in-action (herein collectively called "receivables"), or to advance moneys or extend credit to the 
or thereon, or to factor the sales or finance the accounts of the Debtor (either according to any present or future existing agreement or ac-
ng to any changes in any such agreement or on any other terms and arrangements from time to time agreed upon with the Debtor, hereby 
inting to and waiving notice of any and all such agreements, terms and arrangements and changes thereof) or to otherwise directly or in* 
dy advance money to or give or extend faith and credit to the Debtor, or otherwise assist the Debtor in financing its business or sales, 
lout obligating you to do any of the foregoing) we, the undersigned, for value received, do hereby jointly and severally unconditionally 
intee to you and your assigns the prompt payment in full at maturity and all times thereafter (waiving notice of non-payment) of any and 
idebtedneas, obligations and liabilities of every kind or nature (both principal and interest) now or at any time hereafter owing to you by 
debtor, and of any and all receivables heretofore and hereafter acquired by you from said Debtor or in respect of which the Debtor has or 
become in any way liable, and the prompt, full and faithful performance and discharge by the Debtor of each and every one of the terms, 
itions, agreements, representation!, warranties, guaranties and provisions on the part of the Debtor contained in any such agreement or ar 
ement or in any modification or addenda thereto or substitution thereof, or contained in any schedule or other instrument heretofore or 
if tar given by or on behalf of said Debtor in connection with the sale or assignment of any such receivables to you, or contained in any other 
iments, undertakings or obligations of the Debtor with or to you, of any kind or nature, and we also hereby jointly and severally agree on 
ind to reimburse you and your assigns for ail expenses, collection charges, court costs and attorney's fees incurred in endeavoring to collect 
iforce any of the foregoing against the Debtor and/or undersigned or any other person or concern liable thereon; for all of which, wu' 
est at the highest lawful contract rate after due until paid, we hereby jointly and severally agree to be directly, unconditionally and primarily 
i jointly and severally with the Debtor, and agree that the same may be recovered in the same or separate actions brought to recover the 
ripal indebtedness. 
Notice of acceptance of this guaranty, the giving or extension of credit to the Debtor, the purchase or acquisition of receivables, or the ad-
ement of money or credit thereon, and presentment, demand, notices of default, non-payment or partial payments and protest, notice of 
tst and ail other notices or formalities to which the Debtor might otherwise be entitled, prosecution of collection or remedies against the Debtor 
[ainst the makers, endorsers, or other person liable on any such receivables or against any security or collateral thereto appertaining, are here-
>ut in any way impairing or affecting our liability for the full amount thereof; and you s^s^noL be, 
: or other remedies against the Debtor or against any person liable on any said receivables, agreements, ol 
uired j g prosecujecojlection^ enforce-
igations, indebtedness orTHolRties 
to enforceorrewrtjux^anv^je^^ 
htfu?ti*bilityln any way be released or affected by reason of ~mny faUtwe^or^eTaTT^n^^ur ipart so to do. 
laranteed, o{ 
ciefp; nor she 
This guaranty is absolute, unconditional and continuing and payment of the sums for which the undersigned become liable shall be made to 
at your office from time to time on demand as the same become or are declared due, notwithstanding that you hold reserves, credits, collateral 
rcurity against which you may be entitled to resort for payment, and one or more and successive or concurrent actions may be brought here-
gainst the undersigned jointly and severally, either in the same action in which the Debtor is sued or in separate actions, as often as deemed 
table. We expressly waive and bar ourselves from any right to set-off, recoup or counter-claim any claim or drmand against said Debtor, or 
tut any other person or concern liable on said receivables, and, as further security to you, any and all debts or liabilities now or hereafter 
ig to us by the Debtor or by such other person or concern are hereby subordinated to your claims and are hereby assigned to you. 
Bach guarantor shall continue liable hereunder until you actually receive written notice from him by registered mail terminating the same 
> him; but the giving of such notice shall not terminate this guaranty as to any other guarantor, nor relieve the one giving such notice from 
lity as to any debt, undertaking or liability incurred or undertaken prior to such time. The death of any of the guarantors shall not terminate 
guaranty as to his estate or as to the surviving guarantors, but the same shall continue in full force and effect until notice of termination is 
n and received as hereinbefore provided and all of said indebtedness, liabilities or obligations created or assumed are fully paid. 
In case Bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, or proceedings for reorganization, or for the appointment of a receiver, trustee or custodian 
:he Debtor or over its property or any substantial portion thereof, be instituted by or against the Debtor, or if the Debtor becomes insolvent 
lakes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or attempts to effect a composition with creditors, or encumber or dispose of all or a sub-
aal portion of its property, or if the Debtor defaults in the payment or repurchase of any of such receivables or indebtedness as the same 
due, or fails promptly to make good any default in respect of any undertaking, then the liability of the undersigned hereunder shall at 
' option and without notice become immediately fixed and be enforceable for the full amount thereof, whether then due or not, the same as 
gh all said receivables, debts and liabilities has become past due. 
This guaranty shall inure to the benefit of yourself, your successors and assigns. It shall be binding jointly and severally on the under-
id, their heirs, representatives and assigns, regardless of the number of persons signing as guarantors or the turn or order of their signing. 
This instrument shall be governed as to validity, interpretation, effect and in all other respects by the laws and decisions of the State of 
fornia. 
41 Park Terrace Dr. 
I t Lake C i tv , Utah 
lidence Address 
-1K&*^ 
^tm^u^^ 
^. JJ*3§.s Bkins 
^jf^fctL -C^Uc 
S. 0 . Ekins 
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n^fc/. ^ ^ ^ 
In consideration of the financial acuomou.itu.-n^ given or 10 ue u'ven 
or continued by Valley Bank and Trust Company [ b.:i.» " hereafter) to V . Ross and 
Sonoma Q. Ekins ("Borrower" hereafter) Uu- undersigned agrees JS 
follows: 
Borrower has the following obligations uwunj u. tie undersigned: 
A. Title of obligation or instrument Deed of Trusj 
B. Date Of Such obligation December 27tt., 19 79 
C. Due date of obligation 
D. Present balance owing 
£. Security for obligation lot,14.08, Mt. Olympus Pork *4 
Borrower has or is proposing to obtain o loan from bank dated
 m 
May 7 19 81 , in the amount of $ 67,000 uO and secured by the same 
security or portions thereof as are presently pU*ti«jcd to undersigned and 
described in Paragraph £. 
In consideration of the credit extended to liorrower by the Bank, the 
undersigned hereby subordinates its security hiun-.t \x\ the described security 
to the above security interest of the Bank. The Bank may extend, modify or 
renew the so secured obligation witnqut affecting this subordination. The 
undersigned agrees not to demand, receive, aco-i-t or otherwise realize on the 
security or the security interest or to take any direct or indirect action to 
obtain or realize such security until such time as Bank vs^oaid in ful 1 r-^ 
The undersigned agrees to pay and/or deliver to ttank immediately upon receipt 
any of the described security or proceeds thereof. 
This Agreement shall inure to and be binder, upon the parties and 
their successors, assigns and personal representatives. 
of this 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has ex.-cuted t h i s Agreement as 
A
" "' /flag ^H JJL day of H < T 
Waljt.-i C_ Heller Western Incorporated 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
C O U N T Y O F > ^ / y v w . : . / '- » 
v4A:t\ UNOA 0 URQAUl'K 
OjnJ NOTARY HubuC CALlfORMA 
^
4
 " Cif W4 UuAlf 01 %kH f RAWC1SC0 
My Commm.on (ipaei Dtc 14 1904 
• gi ^ V M V ' V v >i g y tpm 9 w m 9 w 
On this " J.ii ..f 
thousand nine hwml/id .HI.! 
/ _ . . i n ilicyearooe 
J before me 
__, _ _ * . <. . _. n Nul.i/y Public. Suit- oJ California. 
Jul) co/n/m-oioui il.m.l WMMI, JM r^jti.ill) «'i|i|jOuflcil . - • .-'?L-~ ' 
krumn to me to be \\w 
described in ami ili.ii < 
mo la be Clie* person 
mlm _ oi the corporation 
TNtOOCtfnantitOntyA^tx^iAiiw.it «n.c^^«f Mp i . i M»I3- „>u — — « — - » — 
«*flv«i<«>»aci«>"t«mj-•••««.*,.«.% v^ .b«<«« •i«uh * «>• 
*uMM«MtO«*«ft<»MC«QI«.«C<i>«T I t 4 l ) u ^ k r « . >|^«. «. 1 «»«v • • ' , • H . . , 
•»»* ' • •<><•« • Oi vr«*wJ 4kK • • w w J , < « h a . f u t * . , i.-u..»«» O i l 'm„w.^ l - . ( , . , i 
* • » • «0»«*• • •••» »•*».•».„»«#• i A . i « * 
Cowdery'b F oriu No 2b — Acknowledgement M 
Corporation^' C Sees 11901190 1) 
he executed the above and foregoing Acceptance 
id .1 I'M- WIIIJIM HLsiniiiunt, JIKI .IUO known to 
w Jin < \i( uied the within insi r ument on behalf 
of the corporation [lii'iviii II.UIHJ .uid acknowledged (o nic that such 
corporation ex ecu led the Mini 
IN WITNESS IVJIKKKOFJ have hereunto set my haiui and ailued 
my official *enI in the _ . ' . _ . / '._*. i2-' County of „ ,/^'ffiT ' x* "» 
lhcda> and ve.«riiilhiatertificatulir>l above written 
y < oiiiiiii^tiiiii expiie.s.. 
Notary Public. Stale of CuJifunim 
My Commission Expires: NbTAfcf" PUULIC 
UobUJUiq a t : 
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App. vii 
1
 Mr. Tanner also said I was ruining his summer vacation, 
2 a lot of things like that, but I did do those things to 
3 J try and move the case along. In all the conversations I 
had as far as I remember had to do with keeping this case 
5 moving. As you all acknowledge, this case grew like 
6 Topsy. What initially started out to be a collection 
7 matter, because of the posture of the defendants, that 
8 this was in some way aggregious conduct on the part of 
9 the collector, and because of the California law, it grew 
10 a lot. It grew a lot more than the money involved, but 
11 I can't help that. That's what you wanted to do. And I 
12 was mindful of that, and I was hoping someplace along 
13 the line because of the sum that started out to be collected 
14 that we could resolve the issue. It didn't happen. I made 
15 the decision on the law as I saw it and the facts and I 
16 saw them applied to the law, and I in no way got any 
17 input from Mr. Tanner and his office or Mr. Anderson and 
18 his office that reflected on my determination of law and 
19 fact. 
20 Motion for a new trial is denied. The stay is 
21 denied except as agreed to between counsel without the 
22 posting of the appropriate bond as required by the rules. 
23 Thank you, gentlemen. 
24 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I appreciate 
25 the Court's comments. Just one matter though. 
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1 One thing that concerns me is that if the Court 
2 is convinced that these conversations with Mr. Tanner took 
3 20 or 30 seconds and was confined totally to scheduling 
4
 matters, Ifm at a loss to know how the Court can allow 
5 Mr. Tanner to recover for 12 minutes of time and why the 
6 Court - -
7 THE COURT: I can tell you - -
8 I MR. ANDERSON: - - the fact that 20 
9 1 seconds1 conversation becomes 12 minutes of conversation 
10 on every time sheet that doesn't taint - -
11 THE COURT: That's an easy answer. I 
12 can give you a straight, easy answer. Frequently when 
13 I'm answering the telephone, because there are three lines, 
14 I have to put people on hold. Mr. Tanner says I'm holding, 
15 and that's at my client's expense. And somebody has got 
16 to pay for my time. That's the business I'm in. 
17 I can certainly account for that. If in fact 
18 I said hold the phone while I get the file, which may be in 
19 Mrs. Renshaw's office, my court reporter, to see what 
20 you're talking about, or hold the phone while I pull out 
21 those documents that may be on my side bar for the 
22 purpose of specifically finding out where they are, I 
23 suppose if Mr. Tanner wants to charge his clients for that 
24 time while he's waiting, he can, but I don't keep time 
25 records. I'm just responding to the question. And this 
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J J. 
was a complicated case. And I suppose when a piece of 
paper might have to do with the question being specifically 
asked, it may take me some time to get. 
This may come as a surprise to you. This is 
not my only case. 
MR. ANDERSON: I appreciate that. 
THE COURT: Ifve other things I'm looking 
for, and if I can't find it right away I might put 
Mr. Tanner on hold for 15 minutes while I'm looking for 
what he wanted me to respond to. Independently I can't 
remember the length of that conversation, but I do have 
occasions when I do have lawyers on hold for some time 
to find out whether the documents they are talking about 
have in fact been received in this office or whether they 
are across the street in the County Clerk's Office, not 
atypical as what I have here today. I've got all your 
courtesy copies, and I don't have the file. And the reason 
I don't have the file is because one of you has asked 
Mrs. Renshaw, the court reporter, to transcribe the record, 
and she's got the file. So if you called and asked me 
what's in the file, I would have to find out where it is 
just today. And that might take me a little while, to 
find where Brad or Mrs. Renshaw has got it, and that would 
account for a lapse of time. And I can explain that. 
Okay. Thank you. 
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